COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

"A Tradition of Service Since 1850"

DATE: May 1, 2022
FILE:

OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

FROM: JOHN L. SATTERFIELD, COMMANDER
CHIEF OF STAFF

TO: TIMOTHY K. MURAKAMI
UNDERSHERIFF

SUBJECT: FACTUAL OVERVIEW – SAN FERNANDO COURT USE OF FORCE INCIDENT

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a general overview of the facts and information connected to the use of force incident which occurred on March 10, 2021, in the San Fernando Court lock-up. This overview is based on document review, personal knowledge, and information learned through inquiry.

To assist me in this endeavor, I have compiled a timeline from the information available to me. It should be noted this overview is not connected to any of the active investigations currently underway and is based on my own understanding of the facts. Further investigation will undoubtedly bring forth additional facts and further illuminate the events surrounding and including this incident, but I do not want to possibly interfere with on-going investigations by conducting my own. I firmly believe my account to be accurate, true, and correct at this time. If called, I will testify to the following in an administrative investigation under penalty of discipline, or criminal investigation under penalty of perjury.

STATEMENT:

On November 18, 2021, the Chief of Professional Standards Division (PSD), Chief Kelly Porowski (now retired), provided Undersheriff Timothy Murakami with a DVD disk containing a video file depicting a use of force (UOF) which occurred on March 10, 2021, at San Fernando Court. She alerted him as to her concerns regarding the UOF, specifically the amount of time a deputy had his knee on a suspect's head, and that the case appeared to have several issues indicating it was not handled correctly from the start.

> **NOTE:** It is not uncommon for the Chief of PSD to advise the Undersheriff regarding matters which are problematic, complex, or have the possibility of bringing negative attention to the Department. Undersheriff Murakami immediately alerted the Chief of Staff, Chief Jorge Valdez (then commander).

Chief Valdez brought the DVD to his office and, along with Captain Anthony Blanchard (then lieutenant) and myself, Commander John Satterfield (then Captain of Sheriff's Information Bureau), we viewed the video. All three of us

shared our significant concerns regarding what we viewed and unanimously agreed we needed to notify Sheriff Alex Villanueva immediately, and that notification could not wait for the following day. We called the Sheriff but the call went to voicemail. Shortly afterward, he returned our call and by utilizing the speaker feature, we briefed him on what we saw and shared our concerns. The DVD video file was too large to email, so I opened the Skype application on my phone and "Skype'd" the Sheriff, as we were speaking to him on another phone. He answered my "Skype call" on his iPad and we (Valdez, Blanchard, Satterfield) played the video for the Sheriff.

After viewing the video, the Sheriff told us to: (1) ensure a **criminal investigation** had been opened; (2) the involved deputy had already been **relieved of duty**; and, (3) every deputy in the video who **failed to intervene** was being investigated for allowing this to occur, especially the supervisors. Additionally, he told us to find out the status of the investigation, and if something was not done, find out why and make it happen.

> **NOTE:** This was the first time I had ever viewed, or been made aware, of this UOF incident. Due to the eerie similarity to the murder of George Floyd, it was immediately obvious neither Chief Valdez or Captain Blanchard had ever seen it either, based on their reactions and our conversation at the time. It was also obviously clear, based on the Sheriff's statements and reactions, that he had never seen the video before or been made aware of it.

A digital forensic analysis **(EXHIBIT A)** of the computer workstation used to play the video was conducted which confirmed a DVD titled [redacted] was played on the computer workstation on November 18, 2021, at 16:03:54. The same analysis also showed there had been no other DVD ever viewed on the computer at any other date or time. A check of both the Sheriff's and my Skype accounts confirmed a Skype call was made from my account to his account at 17:11 hours, for 16 minutes and 11 seconds **(EXHIBIT B)**. Chief Valdez notified the Undersheriff and he notified Chief Porowski of the Sheriff's orders. At that time, we did not even know for certain the work status of the involved deputy, nor would we be expected to, as those are Division level duties others in the chain of command are expected to perform and do not rise to the level of the Office of the Sheriff.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION:

Internal Criminal Investigation Bureau (ICIB) was notified, and we were later informed the case was opened on November 18, 2021. Court Services Division (CSD) was contacted, and we learned the involved deputy had never been relieved of duty. As the order was relayed through the chain of command to immediately relieve the deputy of duty, it appears someone may have "leaked" the information to the involved deputy, because the deputy went on an unscheduled leave on [redacted], and did not return until [redacted]. The day he returned, he was relieved of duty, pending the outcome of the criminal investigation. The completed criminal case was presented to the District Attorney – Justice System Integrity Division (JSID) on April 14, 2022.

Upon learning CSD had failed to open a criminal case, and failed to relieve the involved deputy of duty, a review was conducted to determine **why**. Assistant Sheriff Limon was advised of this and chose to conceal her prior knowledge and involvement in the incident. Based on what was learned through inquiry, and a review of the Supervisor's Report on Use of Force, an Internal Affairs Bureau investigation was initiated [redacted] for the apparent failures in leadership. Again, at no time during the entire course of this IAB investigation did A/S Limon ever disclose her prior knowledge or involvement in this incident, or the prior knowledge and involvement of Chief Haselrig. Based on the information known at the time, there was interest in the following facts connected to the leadership decisions made by Commander Allan Castellano and Captain Robert Jones:

- The UOF packet was approved by Lieutenant Roberto Hernandez on March 24, 2021, and Captain Robert Jones on March 25, 2021, but Commander Castellano did not approve the UOF report until July 8, 2021 (UOF packets must receive final approval within 20 days of the incident).

  Note: The 15-days the Bureau took to investigate, interview, document, and complete the UOF report was well within standards. But, allowing for a total of 4-months to approve a UOF report at the Division level is a gross failure of leadership and far below acceptable performance. Whatever the amount of corrections which needed to be made at the request of Commander Castellano, it should have only taken a few days.

- An IAB notification did not occur on the day of the incident, March 10, 2021, and was not made until March 19, 2021. The inmate's complaint of pain, visible head injuries, and interview statements should have generated an immediate IAB notification and response. Had this occurred, it is unquestionable the UOF investigation would not have been handled by the unit, and the responding IAB lieutenant would have notified ICIB. All subsequent failures in leadership would have been avoided, had this occured.

  - Per MPP 3-10/111.00, *"In cases where a supervisor has reviewed video of an incident and determined that there is evidence of apparent misconduct, or it appears that a Department member failed to make proper notifications of the incident, the watch commander or supervising lieutenant shall determine the nature and seriousness of the matter.* ***The watch commander or supervising lieutenant shall contact the unit commander, who shall decide if an administrative or criminal investigation is warranted, including the necessity for an immediate***

> ***response by IAB or the Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB). If an administrative or criminal investigation is initiated, the force investigation will be conducted as part of that investigation.*** *If it is determined that an administrative or criminal investigation is not warranted, then the force investigation shall be completed by the watch commander or supervising lieutenant. If an involved employee is not allowed to view video of an incident due to possible misconduct, the watch commander or supervising lieutenant shall notify the member they may be subject to an investigation."*

- The UOF packet approvers all failed to initially generate an IAB or ICIB response, although they did later identify the UOF incident required an IAB investigation. But even at that, they still failed to initiate an ICIB consult and review.

- In his *Area Commander's Review of UOF and Analysis*, Commander Castellano wrote, *"According to Lieutenant Hernandez, a decision was made by an* ***executive above the Division Chief*** *to split the incident into two separate force reviews (one for Inmate Escalante and one for Inmate Ortiz). The force reviews were requested, again by an* ***executive above the Division Chief, to be completed within three days****."*

  > **NOTE:** This was a highly irregular comment and signaled a complete lack of leadership and competent investigation by Commander Castellano himself, to determine the answer of "who" gave that direction. Later investigation revealed neither Lieutenant Hernandez, Lieutenant Lindsey, Captain Jones, Captain Sanchez, Commander Castellano, or Chief Haselrig, when asked both directly and indirectly about this issue, were ever able to say "who" supposedly gave this direction or "where" it came from. A/S Limon was the only "executive above the Division Chief" who possessed knowledge of the incident on the day of the incident. Even the allegations made by A/S Limon and Commander Castellano don't allege he had knowledge of the incident until March 15, 2021 (2-days after the alleged 3-day completion order).

- The Internal Affairs Bureau was first advised of the original UOF case on March 19, 2021, and an IAB investigation [redacted] on the original UOF case was opened on April 13, 2021. The IAB investigation was unable to fully move

forward until Court Services Division completed their UOF investigation, which did not occur until July 12, 2021.

TIMELINE:

Since the second IAB investigation [redacted] was opened regarding this incident, many new details have emerged, and continue to emerge. The following chronological order of events is what I have learned at this time.

On March 10, 2021, a "category 2" UOF incident occurred at Court Services Division (CSD), West Bureau, San Fernando Court, in the court lock-up area. The incident began when Inmate Enzo Escalante punched Deputy Douglas Johnson in the face. An altercation ensued which involved an additional inmate and two additional LASD employees. The use of force was captured on closed circuit surveillance cameras and recorded. The initial force used in self-defense, and then to control and restrain Inmate Escalante appeared to be reasonable, lawful, and within department policy. Once I/M Escalante had submitted to authority, no longer fighting or resisting, and was lying face down on the ground under the control of department personnel, Deputy Johnson was clearly seen with his knee on the inmate's head for approximately three minutes. The UOF used with the knee appeared to be excessive and unlawful.

Soon after the UOF occurred, the area lieutenant, Lieutenant Roberto Hernandez, was notified and viewed the video. Lieutenant Hernandez immediately notified his direct supervisor, Captain Robert Jones, and shared a hyperlink to the video with him. Lieutenant Jones responded to the scene and interviewed Inmate Escalante. During the interview he learned the inmate had [redacted] at the time of the incident and [redacted].

NOTE: Based on my own expert opinion as a state and federal court certified use of force expert, and department policy (MPP 3-10/111.00), an immediate notification should have been made to either IAB or ICIB by the unit commander, for a roll-out team to handle the incident. The decision not to make an immediate notification was a gross mistake from which all other failures in leadership stemmed from. Captain Jones called A/S Limon and discussed the incident with her, as well as shared the video hyperlink with her, almost immediately after he himself learned of the incident and details surrounding the altercation [redacted] According to collective statements made in the press, lawsuits, and IAB interviews, A/S Limon, Chief Haselrig, and Commander Castellano viewed the video together, via a computer file hyperlink, on March 10, 2021. It appears Captain Jones was moving in the direction of an IAB notification when he was first notified on the day of the incident by Lieutenant Hernandez, but after he spoke with A/S Limon his forward

momentum stopped and a concerted effort was initiated which violated policy when the decision was made NOT to follow existing department policy and notify either IAB or ICIB to respond to the location and assume control of the UOF investigation. The authority to notify IAB and ICIB for a response existed with A/S Limon, Chief Haselrig, Commander Castellano, and Captain Jones. Any of them could have made the decision, although it is highly irregular for a category 2 UOF to rise above the level of the bureau unit commander (captain rank) until later in the review and approval process. The other attempt to "cover-up" also occurred on March 10, 2021, when the decision was made to bifurcate the UOF incident into two separate reports.

It is extremely important to note Sheriff Alex Villanueva was unavailable and out of the state at the time, attending session #1 of the FBI National Executive Institute (NEI), in Quantico, Virginia from March 7, 2021, to March 12, 2021. The allegation he was shown the video when he returned to work on March 15, 2021, appears to be an attempt to include him in the failed decision-making process, which occurred five days prior. It is also extremely important to highlight the fact A/S Limon was in possession of a hyperlink leading directly to the video. If she wanted the Sheriff to view the video, she simply had to email it to him, and he could have viewed it from any electronic device. Alleging she waited 5-days to show him a DVD version, when she possessed a hyperlink she could forward via email or text message is illogical.

On March 11, 2021, the UOF notification was entered into the computer system, and two separate file numbers were generated for the incident by Sergeant Steven Bullard.

On March 17, 2021, the UOF packet was completed by Sergeant Bullard and submitted to Lieutenant Hernandez for approval.

On March 18, 2021, according to the UOF packet tracking sheet, the UOF packet was approved by Lieutenant Hernandez and submitted, but was apparently returned for corrections.

On March 19, 2021, the very first notification of the incident was made to IAB (9-days after the incident).

On March 24, 2021, the UOF packet was again approved by Lieutenant Hernandez and submitted to Captain Jones for approval.

On March 25, 2021, the UOF packet was approved by Captain Robert Jones, and an IAB investigation was recommended. The UOF packet was forwarded to CSD Operations and Commander Allan Castellano for approval.

> **NOTE:** During Commander Castellano's IAB interview, he stated [redacted] The UOF Tracking Sheet **(EXHIBIT C)**, contained numerous important dates, stamps, and signatures regarding the UOF packet, and a copy was later located.

On April 13, 2021, the IAB case was opened [redacted] and assigned to IAB Sergeant Benjamin Grubb.

On May 27, 2021, Captain Jacqueline Sanchez signed a document in which she denied permission to prosecute Suspect Enzo Escalante **(EXHIBIT D)**.

> **NOTE:** It appears Captain Sanchez was wrongfully advised, and under the belief, the "Rosas Decision" provided for an agreement we would not file assault charges on certain jail assaults committed, and this UOF incident fell under that provision.

On June 16, 2021, for reasons unknown, the UOF packet was delivered to the office of A/S Limon. A/S Limon ordered her aide, Captain Steven Ruiz (then Lieutenant), to view the UOF video and brief her as to what it contained. Captain Ruiz briefed A/S Limon regarding his findings, and she ordered him to schedule a meeting with Chief Haselrig and Commander Castellano to discuss the incident. On behalf of A/S Limon, Assistant Sheriff's Secretary Patricia Garcia electronically scheduled the meeting **(EXHIBIT E),** and electronically emailed the calendars of Chief Haselrig and Commander Castellano to meet on June 23, 2021, with A/S Limon to discuss the UOF case. Both Chief Haselrig and Commander Castellano electronically accepted the invitation.

> **NOTE:** It must be noted someone has deleted this meeting from A/S Limon's calendar, although Data System's Bureau is able to still retrieve a court admissible record of the calendar from the redundant back-up files. It should be determined as to "who" deleted the record from her calendar and "when," as it can possibly signify a consciousness of guilt. It would also be advisable to check the calendars for the other invited participants.

On June 22, 2021, Captain Ruiz examined the UOF video in depth on his assigned desktop workstation computer and took detailed notes **(EXHIBIT F)**, then briefed A/S Limon as to his observations. A/S Limon was provided with his notes, the UOF packet, and the video, for use in her scheduled meeting. The two major areas of concern Captain Ruiz advised her of were: (1) the W/C made an incorrect statement during suspect interview; and, (2) Captain Sanchez incorrectly interpreted the "Rosas decision" agreement when she denied prosecution of Suspect Escalante, and charges must to be filed on him.

> **NOTE:** The detailed notes **(EXHIBIT F)**, Captain Ruiz took were handwritten on the back of his daily stapled printout of A/S Limon and Sheriff Villanueva's daily

calendar schedule for June 22, 2021. Additionally, Captain Ruiz stated he had no prior knowledge of this incident, and there had never been any mention or discussions of this UOF incident prior to receiving the UOF packet on June 16, 2021. He also told me it is highly irregular to ever receive a "Cat-2" UOF packet at the Assistant Sheriff level, as those duties are Division level and end at the chief level.

On June 23, 2021, the pre-scheduled meeting occurred, from 10:00-10:45, between A/S Limon, Chief Haselrig, & Commander Castellano, in which the UOF video was viewed and discussed.

> **NOTE:** Initially, this UOF incident should have never risen above the rank of captain and when A/S Limon interjected herself into the decision-making process, many levels below her command, a significant disruption and breakdown in the chain of command occurred. Avoiding this is learned in basic leadership and is the manner of "micro-management" error made by new supervisors, not senior level executives.

On June 25, 2021, Commander Castellano contacted Captain Jacqueline Sanchez and instructed her to reverse her original decision not to prosecute Inmate Escalante. Captain Sanchez signed the document to authorize prosecuting Suspect Enzo Escalante **(EXHIBIT G)**.

> **NOTE:** Captain Sanchez explained [redacted] She advised Commander Castellano of this, as well as stated it in her IAB interview. The fact public statements have been made by Commander Castellano alleging the direction came from the Sheriff is a demonstrably false statement.

On July 8, 2021, the UOF packet was approved by Commander Allan Castellano.

On July 12, 2021, the UOF packet was approved by Chief LaJuana Haselrig.

On July 15, 2021, the UOF packet sent to the Discovery Unit.

On September 5, 2021, former Chief Eli Vera was appointed to the rank of Commander and assigned to Court Services Bureau. As a division commander, he was granted full access to all electronically shared files for the division.

> **NOTE:** The Los Angeles Times has reported Mr. Vera took confidential materials regarding this criminal investigation and provided them to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Although the OIG is permitted to possess completed investigations, they are not entitled to possess active criminal investigations. Under any circumstance, there is a strong probability Mr. Vera knowingly violated policy in doing so. It is still unknown who provided those same materials to the Los Angeles Times.

On November 11, 2021, the IAB subject notification form was signed by Deputy Johnson.

On November 18, 2021, Sheriff Villanueva viewed the UOF video for the first time. The ICIB was also opened on Deputy Johnson and the order given to immediately relieve him of duty (ROD).

On [redacted] Deputy Johnson takes leave [redacted]

On November 23, 2021, a second IAB was opened regarding this incident, focusing on the failure to open an ICIB investigation.

On November 30, 2021, the IAB subject notification form was signed by Commander Castellano.

On [redacted], Deputy Johnson returned from his leave and was immediately relieved of duty (ROD).

On [redacted], CSD Commander Castellano takes leave, and remains off work presently.

On January 5, 2022, the [redacted] was signed by Captain Jones, following his notification Chief Haselrig [redacted] March 30, 2022 (the day she retired).

On [redacted] CSD Commander Vera takes leave until March 29, 2021 (the day he retired).

On March 8, 2022, Commander Castellano and Captain Jones were [redacted]

On March 9, 2022, the one-year statute to impose discipline expired on this case, negating the ability for further investigation and discipline for violations discovered involving other employees, including senior ranking employees.

> **NOTE:** The fact this case was allowed to run out of statue before it could be fully investigated and those who apparently also violated accountability for their leadership failures should be examined.

[redacted]

On March 25, 2022, a Los Angeles Times article was published, *"Claim alleges Sheriff Villanueva directed cover-up of deputy kneeling on inmate."* Confidential materials from an active criminal investigation were provided to the reporter, as well as misinformation and demonstrably false statements. Resulting from a review of the case and

investigation, I discovered there was possible misconduct associated with the investigation, as well as a failure of executive leadership, and took I appropriate action. Strictly adhering to policy and procedure, multiple additional investigations were generated.

> **NOTE:** As I have presented in this document, the allegations made in that article do not line up with the facts, and although there were significant failures of leadership at senior levels, the IAB investigation was opened on April 13, 2021, and the criminal investigation was opened on November 18, 2021. Based on this, there would have been an inevitable discovery of all facts connected to the incident. There was no "whistle" to be blown, as the criminal and administrative investigations were well underway. It is also important to note at no time was the reporter ever a suspect in any investigation, but the person(s) who supplied the confidential information are subject to prosecution.

On [redacted], after crucial conversations with each, Assistant Sheriff Robin Limon was appointed to rank of Captain and Chief LaJuana Haselrig decided to retire. Afterward, Sheriff Villanueva held a press conference to announce the news and introduce his new Assistant Sheriff, Holly Francisco. Captain Limon took leave [redacted] and [redacted].

> **NOTE:** It is important to note the sworn ranks of deputy sheriff, sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and commander have civil service protection and union representation. The senior executive ranks of chief (14 positions), Assistant Sheriff (3 positions), and Undersheriff (1 position) serve at the will of the Sheriff and are "at will" employees. The senior executive ranks have no civil service protection and no union representation. The Sheriff can ask for their letter of resignation or remove them from their position for any reason. The Sheriff must have full confidence in his senior executive advisory team and that they will vigorously impose his vision for the Department. The Department has established a practice of allowing those removed from a senior executive rank to return to the last civil service protected position they held within the organization for which they completed probation. For example, when this occurred with Eli Vera, he could have been returned to the rank of captain, but instead the Sheriff appointed him as a probationary commander. In the case of Robin Limon, the Sheriff could have returned her to the rank of lieutenant, but instead he appointed her as a probationary captain. It must also be highlighted, it was Sheriff Alex Villanueva who promoted Eli Vera from the rank of captain to chief (skipping commander), and Robin Limon from Lieutenant to chief (skipping captain and commander), then to Assistant Sheriff.

On April 14, 2022, the criminal case of the UOF depicted in the now widely publicized video was presented to the District Attorney – Justice System Integrity Division (JSID) for prosecution.

On April 20, 2022, Suspect Enzo Escalante filed a lawsuit against the Department.

On April 25, 2022, Commander Allan Castellano filed a lawsuit against the Department.

On April 26, 2022, Sheriff Villanueva held a press conference to debunk the false information being circulated regarding this incident.

On April 27, 2022, all completed investigative material was presented to an outside law enforcement agency for their review and monitoring.

On April 28, 2022, Captain Robin Limon filed a lawsuit against the Department.

> **NOTE:** There is absolutely no evidence to support the defamatory public claims made by Robin Limon, Allan Castellano, or Eli Vera that Sheriff Alex Villanueva was EVER informed of this UOF incident at any time prior to November 18, 2021. There is, however, substantial physical and administrative evidence Robin Limon, LaJuana Haselrig, Alan Castellano, and Robert Jones were fully aware of the incident, fully briefed, and viewed the video on the day of the incident. There is also evidence, based on his own admission, Eli Vera gained unauthorized access to confidential materials connected to an active criminal investigation and provided them to someone not connected to that investigation who did not possess authorization to receive those materials at the time.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

I recommend investigators perform a digital forensic analysis of ALL involved workstation computers, in order to extract crucial information such as DVD and shared file videos viewed. This can help to establish "what" they knew and "when" they knew it.

Further investigation should be conducted by interviewing each name stamped or written on the UOF tracking sheet **(EXHIBIT C)**, as they may be able to offer valuable insight into the events surrounding this incident.

Substantial evidence exists both Eli Vera and Robin Limon willfully violated their Agreement of Confidentiality – Executive Level **(EXHIBIT H)** and may be subject to civil, criminal, and/or administrative penalties.

CONCLUSION:

On March 10, 2021, Robin Limon, LaJuana Haselrig, Allan Castellano, and Robert Jones attempted to cover-up a use of force which occurred earlier that day at the San Fernando Court lock-up.

On September 5, 2021, Commander Eli Vera was granted access to shared files containing confidential all information regarding this active criminal investigation.

Sometime afterward, by his own admission, he took those confidential files and evidence without authorization, then shared those files and evidence with persons not authorized to possess them at the time. Based on his own demonstrably false statements, the suspicious timing, and his failure to take corrective action as a departmental executive when he first learned of these issues, his motives clearly appear to be for his own political gain.

On November 18, 2021, this attempted cover-up was discovered and halted, when Sheriff Alex Villanueva became aware of the incident and ordered immediate action be taken to open a criminal investigation, relieve the involved deputy of duty, and examine the failures which ultimately led to an additional administrative investigation.

Based on information learned after November 18, 2021, multiple active administrative and criminal investigations have been initiated. The results of these investigations will uncover many more facts and further clarify the motivations behind the mismanagement of this incident, and reasons for such demonstrably false information being circulated.

EXHIBIT A

SH-AD 32A (8/17)

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

"A Tradition of Service Since 1850"

DATE: April 13, 2022

FILE NO:

OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

FROM: [redacted], SERGEANT
FRAUD & CYBER CRIMES BUREAU

TO: ANDREW MEYER, CAPTIAN
FRAUD & CYBER CRIMES BUREAU

SUBJECT: DIGITAL FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF WORKSTATION [redacted]

The purpose of this correspondence is to document the results of a digital forensic analysis of workstation [redacted]

On April 12, 2022, Sgt. [redacted] and Sgt. [redacted] forensically extracted system information from workstation [redacted]. The information was taken to the Fraud & Cyber Crimes Bureau Cyber Investigations Center where it was analyzed. Below are the results of the analysis:

- **WORKSTATION ANALYZED:** [redacted]
- **DATE/TIME: 11/18/2021, 16:03:54 PACIFIC TIME**
- **USER NAME:** [redacted]
- **APPLICATION USED: VLC 2.2.6**
- **FILE ACCESSED: MAIN LOCKUP 1.MP4**
- **DRIVE TYPE: OPTICAL DRIVE**
- **DISK VOLUME LABEL:** [redacted]

According to the analysis, there was no evidence of additional views on this workstation.

If you have any questions, please contact Sergeant [redacted] at [redacted]

[redacted]

EXHIBIT B



Commander Satterfield's Skype



Sheriff Villanueva's Skype Record

EXHIBIT C

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Court Services Division
Incident Report / Investigation Tracking Form

Type of Incident:

- ☐ **Force (20 days)**
  - ☐ Category 1
  - ☒ Category 2
  - ☐ Allegation
- ☐ **Traffic Incident (20 days)**
  - ☐ Collision
  - ☐ Incident
  - ☐ Work Damage
  - ☐ Vandalism
  - ☐ Unknown
- ☐ **Inmate Grievance**
- ☐ **Civil Claim (15 days)**
- ☐ **WCSCR (20 days)**
- ☐ **Admin. Invest. (60 days)**

Bureau/Court:	West Bureau/ San Fernando Courthouse
File Number:	921-00091-4464-145
PDE#:	2527511
Date of Incident:	03/10/21
Handling Supervisor:	Bullard #[redacted]
Reviewing Supervisor:	Hernandez #[redacted]
Date Submitted for W/C Review:	03/17/21
Date Submitted to Operations:	03/18/21
Date Submitted for Final Ops Review:	3/23/2021 AC 1536
Date Submitted for Capt. Review:	3/24/2021 AC 1608
Date Submitted for HQ Review:	
A/LT. ~~Lt.~~ Review by CSDHQ SGT. MORENO #[redacted] Date: 06-02-21	REVIEWED - FWD TO COMMANDER CASTELLANO
CSDHQ Cmdr. Review by _____ Date: _____	
Date Submitted to Discovery Unit:	

Submitted Documentation:

- ☐ Supervisor's Memorandum
- ☐ Watch Commander's memorandum and/or contents noted
- ☒ Supervisor's Report on Use of Force (Form SH-R-438P)
- ☐ Employee's use of force memo(s)
- ☐ Witness memo(s)
- ☐ Supervisor's Report on Damage to Vehicle (SH-R-257)
- ☐ Vehicle Accident or Incident Report (SH-R-665)
- ☐ In-Service Roster, Time Copy
- Other related documentation:
  - ☒ CD/DVD's: 3/5
  - ☒ SH-R-49
  - ☒ Supplemental Reports: 12
  - ☒ Other: Medical Report, Safety Chair log, SI01)
  - ☐ CHP 555
  - ☒ Inmate Injury Report(s)
  - ☐ Photographs: ____

CONTENTS 3/18 MICHAEL METCALF [redacted] NOTED — PACKAGE RECEIVED IN OPS

CONTENTS 6-16-21 Russell R. Moreno [redacted] NOTED

5/15/21 CONTENTS ROBERTO HERNANDEZ NOTED — PACKAGE RECEIVED

CONTENTS 6-2-21 Russell R. Moreno [redacted] NOTED

CONTENTS 05/05/21 LIEUTENANT JOHN L. LINDSAY [redacted] NOTED

COLLECTIONS NEEDED PENDING ADMIN INVEST. RETURNED PENDING OUTCOME.

RECEIVED RL MAY 14 2021 COURT SERVICES DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

RECEIVED JUN 15 2021 RL COURT SERVICES DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

3/30 TO LT LATER FOR REVIEW MB

CONTENTS AC 6-4-21 COMMANDER ALLEN CASTELLANO [redacted]

CORRECTIONS NEEDED

RECEIVED MAR 30 2021 RL COURT SERVICES DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

EXHIBIT D

UNIT COMMANDER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FOR CRIMINAL FILING

INCIDENT INFORMATION	
INCIDENT FACILITY	INCIDENT DATE
SAN FERNANDO COURT	03-10-2021
INCIDENT URN	CUSTODY REFERENCE NUMBER
921-00091-4464-145	4400-2021-0310-202
INCIDENT UNIT COMMANDER	INVESTIGATING OFFICER
Jacqueline H. Sanchez	DETECTIVE HORTON # [redacted]

REVIEW INFORMATION	
☐	I have reviewed the complaint report (SH-R-49), photographs, and video related to the incident. The criminal report may be submitted for prosecution.
☑	I have reviewed the complaint report (SH-R-49), photographs, and video related to the incident. The criminal report may **NOT** be submitted for prosecution at this time.

UNIT COMMANDER SIGNATURE:	DATE:
Jacqueline H. Sanchez	05/27/2021

Reference: Custody Operations Directive 15-007 "Filing Assault on Staff Criminal Reports"
Rev 12/2015

EXHIBIT E

Garcia, Patricia L.

Subject: UOF West Bureau
Location: A/S Limon's Office

Start: Wed 6/23/2021 10:00 AM
End: Wed 6/23/2021 10:45 AM

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Accepted

Organizer: Garcia, Patricia L.
Required Attendees: Robin A. Limon ([redacted]@lasd.org); Haselrig, LaJuana J.; Castellano, Allen M.

Scheduled at A/S Limon's direction - PattiG - 6/16

EXHIBIT F

June 22, 2021

Tuesday

June 2021

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

July 2021

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

[redacted]

June 22, 2021

Tuesday

June 2021

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

July 2021

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

[redacted]

EXHIBIT G

UNIT COMMANDER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FOR CRIMINAL FILING

INCIDENT INFORMATION	
INCIDENT FACILITY:	INCIDENT DATE:
SAN FERNANDO COURT	03-10-2021
INCIDENT URN:	CUSTODY REFERENCE NUMBER:
921-00091-4464-145	4400-2021-0310-202
INCIDENT UNIT COMMANDER:	INVESTIGATING OFFICER:
Captain Jacqueline H. Sanchez	DETECTIVE HORTON # [redacted]

REVIEW INFORMATION	
☑	I have reviewed the complaint report (SH-R-49), photographs, and video related to the incident. The criminal report may be submitted for prosecution.
☐	I have reviewed the complaint report (SH-R-49), photographs, and video related to the incident. The criminal report may **NOT** be submitted for prosecution at this time.

UNIT COMMANDER SIGNATURE:	DATE:
Jacqueline H. Sanchez	06/25/2021

Reference: Custody Operations Directive 15-007 "Filing Assault on Staff Criminal Reports"
Rev. 12/2015

EXHIBIT H

AGREEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY
(Executive Level)

As an executive of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, you will necessarily have access to internal information and documentation of a sensitive and confidential nature controlled by state and/or federal statutes. Examples of such confidential information, include, but are not limited to, information shared at the executive level, including deliberative process or executive privilege communications, attorney-client privileged communication, strategy discussions, peace officer personnel files, criminal offender records, medical history/treatment information, employment, promotional and discipline records, and other records of a sensitive, confidential and privileged nature.

Misuse of such information may adversely affect an individual's rights and may violate constitutional rights of privacy. In many cases, access to, and disclosure of, such confidential information is controlled by the California Government and Penal Codes, and civil and/or criminal penalties may be imposed for improper use or disclosure thereof.

As an executive of the Sheriff's Department, you shall only access confidential information to the extent necessary to perform your assigned job functions. You shall maintain the confidentiality of all sensitive and confidential information to which you have access. You shall not disclose any information, reports or gathered documents either for professional or personal use unless the disclosure is in conformance with this agreement and in compliance with the law. Any executive who is responsible for improper access, disclosure, dissemination, or any other misuse of confidential information is subject to immediate dismissal and may be subject to civil, criminal or administrative penalties.

I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING AND AGREE THAT AS A CONDITION OF MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, I WILL NOT IMPROPERLY ACCESS, DISCLOSE, DISSEMINATE OR OTHERWISE MISUSE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT ANY SUCH MISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSSAL AND MAY SUBJECT ME TO CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES.

PRINT NAME: ROBIN A. LIMON

SIGNATURE: R. Limon DATE: 5-13-21

APPROVED BY:

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(Executive Level)

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PRINT NAME: ELIEZER VERA

SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: 5/14/21

APPROVED BY: _____